Abstract. We present two attacks on the security of the private grouping proof by Batina et al. [1] . We introduce the first formal models for yoking proofs. One model incorporates the aspect time, ensuring that the grouping proofs were generated at a specific time. A more general variant only provides a proof that tags were together at some time. Based on these models we propose two new protocols to generate sound yoking proofs that can trivially be extended to multiple parties and that attain narrow-strong privacy.
that are based on public key cryptography. We will show two separate attacks on the security of their proposed protocols to generate yoking proofs.
One of the crucial aspects for grouping proofs is timing. Since a grouping proof is verified off-line by definition only a trusted party can assure the time the grouping proof took place. It's insufficient to simply submit the finished proof to the trusted party after finishing, since this does not prevent delaying the submission of the proof. The trusted party should actively participate in the protocol to avoid replaying and delaying. We present two security models: one that ensures timed grouping proofs, with trusted third party and one for nontimed grouping proofs without trusted third party. In the later case the proof only guarantees that the tags participated in a grouping proof without specifying any time or order.
Outline Section 2 presents two attacks on the Batina et al. In Sect. 3 we introduce the privacy and security model used throughout this paper. In Sect. 4 and Sect. 5 our new yoking proofs are proposed and their security and privacy is proven.
Attacks
Batina et al. [1] proposed two protocols to generate grouping proofs, one with colluding tag prevention and a basic one. Figure 1 describes the one with colluding tag prevention. The basic protocol, without colluding tag prevention, can be obtained by setting r s = 1 in the protocol from Fig. 1 . The proposed protocols build upon an authentication protocol, EC-RAC [10] for which the security is claimed to be related to the security of the Schnorr identification protocol [15] .
We will now show how an adversary can break the security of these protocols, i.e. the adversary can generate a valid grouping proof that T a and T b were scanned together.
First Attack
For authentication protocols, the temporal order of the messages is crucial. Authentication protocols consist of three stages: commit, exam and response. If the value of the exam is known before the prover needs to provide the commitment to its randomness (which is used later on for the response, the prover can construct a crooked proof). This can easily be shown for tag T b . We are only interested in the value of the exam α = xcoord(r s T a1 ), where xcoord(P ) returns the xcoordinate of the point P = (x P , y P ). Given this tag's public key S b = s b P , the adversary can construct a valid response T b,1 = rP − αS b , T b,2 = rY for r ∈ R Z l . One can argue whether or not public keys of tags are known to the adversary, since the claimed privacy of the protocol implies that the adversary cannot learn the public key of an RFID tag from the exchanged messages, but we can definitely conclude that the value r s , chosen by a genuine reader, does not provide any protection against colluding tags.
rs ∈R Z "start right", Ta,1, rs This weakness can be mitigated by requiring that the tag T b first has to send the commitment T b,1 before being presented with the exam. However, the resulting proof, presented by the (potentially untrusted) reader to the verifier, contains no verifiable information on the temporal ordering of the messages, still allowing this attack.
Second Attack
For the second attack, no knowledge of public keys of the tags is required. In the first phase the adversary needs to collect a tuple (α, T 1 , T 2 ) for which the following relations hold: T 1 = rP and T 2 = (r + αs)Y , for s the secret key of the target tag and r an unknown random number. To collect this tuple one can eavesdrop on the protocol with honest tags: (xcoord(T b,2 ), T a,1 , T a,2 ) and (xcoord(r s T a1 ), T b,1 , T b,2 ). Since there is no reader authentication (and the reader can be untrusted), one can also query the tags actively to collect this attack tuple.
In the second stage one can trick a genuine reader to accept T 
Again, this attack is independent on the value of r s .
Privacy and Security Model
In this paper we will use the privacy model from Hermans et al. [8] . We will also use the oracles defined in this privacy model for the security games.
Privacy Model of Hermans et al.
The intuition behind the RFID privacy model is that privacy is guaranteed if an adversary cannot distinguish with which one of two RFID tags (of its choosing), he is interacting through a set of oracles. A brief overview of these oracles is given in App. A. Privacy is defined as a distinguishability game between a challenger and the adversary. This game is defined as follows. First the challenger picks a random challenge bit b and then sets up the system S with a security parameter k. Next, the adversary A can use a subset (depending on the privacy notion) of the following oracles to interact with the system:
By using the DrawTag oracle the adversary can arbitrarily select which tags to interact with. Based upon the challenge bit b the system that the challenger presents to the adversary will behave as either the left tags T i or the right tags T j . After A called the oracles, it outputs a guess bit g.
In this paper the Result(π) is not used, since the grouping proofs are validated off-line at a later stage. For the full privacy definition we refer the reader to [8] .
For the protocols that require a trusted third party (TTP), we define the SendTTP(m) → m ′ oracle, to send a message m to the TTP and receive the reply m ′ .
Privacy Notions All adversaries presented in this paper are narrow strong adversaries, which are allowed to use all the oracles available except the Result oracle.
We also define X * privacy notion variants, where X refers to the basic privacy notion and * to the notion that arises when the corruption abilities of the adversary are further restricted with respect to the Corrupt oracle. The restricted Corrupt oracle will only return the non-volatile state of the tag. This restriction allows to exclude trivial privacy attacks on multi-pass protocols, that require the tag to store some information in volatile memory during the protocol run.
Grouping Proof
A grouping proof protocol has the following two properties: correctness, soundness. Correctness and soundness are necessary to establish the security of the protocol.
A function f : N → R is called polynomial in the security parameter k
Definition 1. Correctness. A scheme is correct if a legitimate grouping proof is rejected with negligible probability and all tags involved are identified correctly with overwhelming probability.
We make a distinction between timed grouping proofs and non-timed grouping proofs. For a timed grouping proof, the time at which the proof was generated is recorded and can be verified afterwards. For a protocol to achieve timed grouping proof soundness a trusted third party is required to provide timestamps.
Definition 2 (Timed Grouping Proof Soundness).
In the first phase of the soundness game the adversary may interact with all tags. After the first phase ends the challenger notes the current time t 1 . In the second phase the adversary can also interact with all tags, except for one tag T c ∈ S, where S ⊂ T is the set of tags for which a grouping proof is produced by the adversary. This tag T c should also remain uncorrupted during the entire game. The adversary outputs a candidate grouping proof σ at the end of the second phase. A grouping proof scheme is sound if no polynomially bounded strong adversary, with non-negligible probability, is able to produce a valid grouping proof for a set of tags S with time t 2 > t 1 .
The above definition ensures that even if all tags but one participating in the yoking protocol collude it remains impossible to construct a valid grouping proof without cooperation of all tags.
A non-timed proof is restricted to proving that the tags in question were together and completed the protocol. One cannot in any way determine from the yoking proof at what time this happened. As such, once a proof is produced it can be reused without limits.
Definition 3 (Non-Timed Grouping Proof Soundness). In the first phase of the soundness game the adversary may interact with all tags, except T a . This also implies that corrupting T a is impossible in the first phase.
In the second phase the adversary cannot interact with any tag except T a . The adversary outputs a candidate grouping proof σ at the end of the second phase. A grouping proof scheme is sound if no polynomially bounded strong adversary, with non-negligible probability, is able to produce a valid grouping proof for the group of tags S = {T a , T b , . . .}, even when allowed to corrupt T a in the second phase.
During the entire game T b cannot be corrupted.
By splitting the soundness game in two phases we ensure that at least two of the tags in the grouping proof cannot perform a yoking protocol together. In the first phase T a cannot be used, but T b can, while in the second phase only T a can be used.
Yoking Proof with Trusted Party
Figure 2 presents our new protocol, which is based on the Randomised Schnorr protocol [4] to ensure soundness as well as tag privacy. The exam e is generated by the trusted time stamping authority (TTSA) after receiving the tags' commitments R a1 , R a2 , R b1 , R b2 . This ensures the proper ordering of the messages in the authentication protocol, necessary to avoid crooked proofs. Given the exam, each tag generates a response s a , s b . The TTSA finally signs all messages and the timestamp provided the final values s a , s b arrive before the session with the TTSA times out. The signature is returned to the reader, who stores the full grouping proof σ for later verification.
Note that neither the reader, nor the TTSA are able to learn the identity of the tags. The grouping proof can only be checked by the verifier with secret key y. The proof is verified as follows:
The public keys X a , X b can be checked in the database of the verifier. This ensures that tag T a and tag T b were scanned together at time ts.
The main cost for each tag is two scalar-EC point multiplications. The most complex operation, the signature, is performed by the TTSA.
Our protocol can easily be extended to multiple tags, at no additional cost for the RFID tags.
Security and Privacy
Grouping Proof Soundness The soundness of the grouping proof is based on the one more discrete logarithm (OMDL) assumption, which was introduced by Bellare et al. [2] . Let P be a generator of a group G ℓ of order ℓ. Let O 1 be an oracle that returns random elements A i = a i P of G ℓ . Let O 2 (·) be an oracle that returns the discrete logarithm of a given input base P . The OMDL problem is to return the discrete logarithms for each of the elements obtained from the m queries to O 1 , while making strictly less than m queries to O 2 (·). Proof. Assume an adversary A that forges the timed grouping proof.
We now construct an adversary B that breaks the unforgeability of the signature σ, or an adversary B' that breaks the OMDL.
If A produces a σ with timestamp t 2 > t 1 this implies that either it communicated at time t 2 with the TTSA to produce σ or that A forged the signature. In the latter case we can easily use A to break the existential unforgeability of the signature scheme.
From now on we can assume that the messages R a1 , R a2 , R b1 , R b2 , e, s A , s B where faithfully exchanged with the TTSA around time t 2 using the SendTTS oracle.
Let X A = O 1 (). In the first phase B' simulates the i'th pair of SendTag queries to tag T a as follows:
In the second phase, the adversary A calls SendTTS with R a1 , R a2 , R b1 , R b2 . B' simulates SendTTS by generating a random e after which A will call SendTTS with s A and s B . Upon receiving these, B' rewinds A until the moment it calls SendTTS with R a1 , R a2 , R b1 , R b2 and sends back a fresh e ′ after which A will send new s Note that the protocol uses randomized Schnorr, which has been proven narrow strong private in [4] . Below we give a modified proof for the [8] model, using a standard hybrid argument [6, 17] .
Proof. For simplicity we will only consider a single execution of the protocol. A full proof can be obtained by using a standard hybrid argument.
Assume an adversary A that breaks narrow strong privacy. We will create a adversary B that breaks DDH (with A = aP, B = bP and C = abP or C = rP ) which executes A. B sets Y = B at the beginning, chooses a random bit b and simulates the SendTag oracles for a single protocol run to A as follows:
-First SendTag(vtag): select r ∈ R Z l and return R a1 = r ′ P − A, R a2 = C -Second SendTag(vtag, e): s A = ex i + r ′ where x i is either the secret key of tag T i or T j , depending on the tags passed to the DrawTag that generated vtag and the random bit b.
At the end of the game A outputs a guess bit g. B outputs (b == g) as output to the DDH challenger.
In case of a real DDH instance (i.e. C = abP ) the simulation perfectly follows the real protocol, hence it follows that Pr 
Yoking Proof without Trusted Parties
In case no trusted parties are available we have to rely on some form of signature (or MAC) for validation of the grouping proof. We cannot rely on authentication protocols since ordering of messages is not guaranteed when validation takes place off-line. Figure 3 shows the proposed protocol to generate a yoking proof. In the first round, both tags T a and T b generate a one-time key pair for signing, with public key R a and private key r a . In the second round, both tags MAC both public keys with their permanent private key x a . Note that one can also use a signature scheme instead of a MAC. In the final round, both tags sign the MAC's s a , s b using their one-time signing key.
One possible instantiation of the signature scheme is a Schnorr signature [15] , which requires ECC and a hash function. The hash function can also be reused for the MAC function (or the MAC can be replaced with a signature). However, MAC functions and Schnorr signatures do not guarantee privacy. In Appendix B we show how to make privacy preserving signatures, which can replace the MAC function to ensure narrow strong privacy. Note that the final signature does not need to be privacy preserving as the signing key is freshly generated for every protocol run. Our protocol can easily be extended to multiple tags, at the cost of additional communication. The computational overhead will remain small, since the number of signatures (and MACs) a tag needs to compute are independent of the number of tags in the grouping proof. However, since the messages that need to be signed (or on which the MAC algorithm needs to be deployed) increase in size, the computational effort will slightly raise.
Security proof
Theorem 3. The protocol from Fig. 3 is non-timed grouping proof sound under the existential unforgeability of the MAC and the (one-time) signature scheme.
Proof. Assume an adversary A that breaks the non-timed grouping proof soundness. We will use A to construct an adversary B that breaks either the existential unforgeability of the MAC or the signature scheme.
B runs A internally and simulates the grouping proof challenger to A. At the start of the grouping proof game B sets X b = KeygenMAC. During the first phase of the grouping proof challenge B simulates the SendTag oracle of T b to A as follows:
All other oracle queries are simulated according to the protocol specification. In the second phase of the grouping proof game, B generates a random x a and passes this to A. At the end of the game A outputs a σ = {R a , R b , s a , s b , σ a , σ b }.
By assumption, σ is a valid grouping proof, implying that s b is a valid MAC. If s b was not requested during the first phase through the MAC oracle with R a ||R b , this implies that s b is a valid forgery and B breaks the existential unforgeability of the MAC scheme.
If, on the one hand, it was requested through a MAC oracle call, the definition of the simulation above by B to A implies that there also was a call to KeygenSign, which yielded the specified R b . Since σ is a valid grouping proof, σ b is valid signature on s a , s b using the private key matching to the public key R b . If σ b was not requested during the first phase through the Sign oracle, σ b is a valid forgery and B breaks the existential unforgeability of the one-time signature scheme.
If, on the other hand, σ b was requested through a Sign oracle this implies that the full grouping proof presented by A took place in the first phase of the grouping proof challenge. This is impossible however, since x a was only generated after the first phase.
⊓ ⊔
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented two attacks on the security of the yoking proofs as proposed by Batina et al. [1] . To ensure privacy of the RFID tags that take part in the protocol to generate a grouping proof, one should move away from the symmetric key cryptographic building blocks in favour of public key cryptography. Not only will this provide us with scalability at the verifier side, RFID tags will also have stronger privacy guarantees, i.e. narrow strong privacy. This paper introduced the first formal models of the security of yoking proofs. In the first model, time is taken into account, since for most use cases one is not only interested in two RFID tags being scanned together, but also when these tags were scanned together. In the second, we consider how to build a grouping proof without trusted third party. We provide for each model a protocol, for which both security and privacy are proven. Our proposed protocol with trusted timestamp authority is also the first one for which the verifier can upon verification of the yoking proof be absolutely sure that the tags were scanned at this point in time.
A Oracles Model Hermans et al.
The model of Hermans et al. [8] defines the following oracles for the privacy game:
-CreateTag(ID) → T i : on input a tag identifier ID, this oracle creates a tag with the given identifier and corresponding secrets, and registers the new tag with the reader. A reference T i to the new tag is returned. Note that this does not reject duplicate IDs. -Result(π): on input π, this oracle returns a bit indicating whether or not the reader accepted session π as a protocol run that resulted in successful authentication of a tag. If the session with identifier π is not finished yet, or there exists no session with identifier π, ⊥ is returned. -Corrupt(T i ): on input a tag reference T i , this oracle returns the complete internal state of T i . Note that the adversary is not given control over T i .
B Privacy preserving signatures
To obtain privacy preserving signatures with identification we make a slight modification to the Schnorr signature scheme [15] . The original Schnorr signature scheme works as follows:
-r ∈ R Z l -e = H(M ||rP ), s = ex + r -Output s, e.
In the modified scheme, rY , instead of e is provided together with s.
-r ∈ R Z l -e = H(M ||rP ), s = ex + r -Output s, rY .
The verifier can retrieve rP = y −1 (rY ) and as such compute e. By computing e −1 (sP − rP ) = X, s is verified. By checking the database for a registered public key X, one obtains both identification and verification of the signature at the same time, provided the number of tags remains significantly lower than ℓ.
Privacy of this modified scheme can be shown under the DDH assumption. Existential unforgeability follows in the same way as for the Schnorr signature when the verifier is provided with y.
